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Environmental Law
by Travis M. Trimble*
In 2014,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
addressing an issue of first impression, rejected the district court's use
of a Lone Pine case-management order as a means of testing the
sufficiency of the plaintiffs' pleadings in a state law environmental torts
case. The court also interpreted Florida law to mean that plaintiffs are
not required to allege that groundwater contamination exceeded
regulatory maximum contaminant levels for drinking water to maintain
their claims and that they could recover "stigma" damages to their
property without alleging actual contamination. The United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida, also in a matter of first
impression, concluded that claims brought under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 are subject to a six-year limitation period
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. Finally, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama concluded
that, for standing purposes, the "zone of interest" protected by section
404 of the Clean Water Act included matters beyond loss of jurisdictional
waters, including water quality and aesthetic and recreational values.
I. PLEADING
In Adinolfe v. United Technologies Corp.,2 a mass tort case alleging
personal injury and property damage resulting from groundwater
contamination, the Eleventh Circuit held that the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida erred in issuing a Lone Pine
order3 and using the resulting submitted facts as a basis to dismiss the
* Instructor, University of Georgia School of Law. Mercer University (B.A., 1986);
University of North Carolina (M.A., 1988); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 1993).
1. For an analysis of environmental law during the prior survey period, see Travis M.
Trimble, Environmental Law, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 65 MERCER L. REV. 929 (2014).
2. 768 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 2014).
3. See Lore v. Lone Pine Corp., No. L-33606-85, 1986 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1626 (Law Div.
1986). In the words of the Eleventh Circuit, the purpose of a Lone Pine order is to "require
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plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(bX6). 4 The circuit court held that the district court should have
ruled on the defendant's motion to dismiss based solely on the sufficiency
of the complaint under the standards set out by the United States
Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly5 and its progeny.'
Although the circuit court declined to address "the general propriety [or]
utility of Lone Pine orders" the court's holding appears to foreclose, or at
least disapprove of, the district court's use of such orders as a means of
assessing the sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint in deciding a
defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.7
The circuit court also held that the plaintiffs' complaint, alleging
generally that contamination from the defendant's plant caused personal
injury and property damage and setting out causes of action arising
under Florida law regarding negligence, nuisance, strict liability, and
recovery in the environmental law context were not insufficient on the
grounds set out in the defendant's motion.8 Specifically, the court first
held the plaintiffs were not required to allege that each property covered
by the complaint had actual contamination.9 Second, the plaintiffs were
not required to allege that contamination discovered under some of the
properties exceeded applicable regulatory safe drinking water standards
under Florida law.'0 Third, the plaintiffs adequately alleged causa-
tion." And fourth, certain plaintiffs were entitled to seek diminution
in property value damages arising out of the "stigma" of contamination
without alleging actual contamination."2 As a result, the Eleventh
Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint
for failure to state a claim.'
3
The plaintiffs were 384 property owners in a residential development
in Palm Beach County, Florida, known as The Acreage. The defendant,
doing business as Pratt & Whitney, operated an aircraft and rocket
engine manufacturing plant (the site) six miles north of The Acreage.
plaintiffs in mass tort cases to provide some factual support, including expert testimony,
for their claims or run the risk of having those claims dismissed." Adinolfe, 768 F.3d at
1167.
4. 768 F.3d at 1169-73; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 12(bX6).
5. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
6. See Adinolfe, 768 F.3d at 1168-69.
7. Id. at 1168.
8. Id. at 1174-75.
9. Id. at 1173.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1175.
12. Id. at 1176-79.
13. Id. at 1179.
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According to the plaintiffs' complaint, the site and The Acreage sit above
the same aquifer, in which water flows north to south, that is the source
of drinking water for The Acreage. The site underwent remediation in
the 1980s, but remained a continuing source of environmental contami-
nation. In 2003, metal drums marked "hazardous waste" were
discovered at the site, and a plume of a particular contaminant, dioxane,
had spread from the drums. In 2008, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) found twenty-four listed contaminants in the soil and
groundwater at the site, and testing done for the defendant found
contaminants present in high concentrations at the site. In 2010, the
Palm Beach County Health Department labeled The Acreage a "cancer
cluster," with some children developing cancerous brain tumors and at
least three adults developing a type of renal cancer. 14 Also in 2010, the
Federal Housing Administration warned appraisers that the cancer
cluster declaration could be harming home values in the area. Samples
from test wells in The Acreage showed the presence of certain contami-
nants that the plaintiffs alleged the defendant released on the site and
that plaintiffs' experts stated had migrated under The Acreage. 5
Over 300 of the individual plaintiffs alleged their properties were
actually contaminated by chemicals that had migrated from the site (the
actual-contamination plaintiffs). The remaining plaintiffs claimed either
their properties were not presently contaminated but would be in the
future, or their properties had lost value because of the proximity to
contaminated property (the anticipated-contamination and proximity
plaintiffs). 6
After the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' initial complaints and
the plaintiffs filed amended complaints, the district court issued a Lone
Pine order giving the plaintiffs sixty days to produce "all evidence they
contend supports the prima facie elements of contamination and
causation," included but not limited to "disclosure of any testing for
contaminants conducted on each plaintiffs property, [I disclosure of any
contaminants found on each plaintiffs property," and expert opinions on
several factual issues, including whether individual properties were
contaminated and whether the defendant had caused the contamination
and other evidence of causation and harm, including diminution in
14. Id. at 1164, 1169-70. One of the adults had her well water tested and found it to
be contaminated with various cancer-causing chemicals. Id. at 1170. She and her husband
filed a related suit for personal injury, Pinares v. United Technologies Corp., No. 10-80883-
CIV-RYSKAMP/VITUNAC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8923 (S.D. Fla., Jan. 19, 2011), which
was consolidated with Adinolfe. Adinolfe, 768 F.3d at 1164.
15. Adinolfe, 768 F.3d at 1169.
16. Id. at 1170.
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value.17 The order also provided that the defendant could respond by
challenging the plaintiffs' compliance with the order within sixty days
of receiving the plaintiffs' evidence."8
In response to the order, the plaintiffs filed declarations from their
experts purporting to show, among other things, causation. The
defendant responded with opinions of its own experts challenging the
validity of the plaintiffs' experts' opinions and moved to dismiss the
plaintiffs' amended complaints for failure to comply with the Lone Pine
order.1" As the Eleventh Circuit noted, even though the district court
intended to keep the two separate, the hearing and proceedings related
to compliance with the Lone Pine order became inextricably linked to the
motion to dismiss the complaint with the district court and the parties
"frequently stray[ing] beyond the four corners of the complaints and
discuss[ing] the expert testimony and factual submissions contained in
the Lone Pine filings."2"
After the hearing, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' amended
complaints and subsequently dismissed with prejudice their second
amended complaints as well. The district court ruled, regarding the
actual-contamination plaintiffs, the complaint was insufficient because
it did not allege that these plaintiffs actually tested for contamination
or that each of their individual properties was actually contaminated.
As a result, the allegation that their properties were contaminated by
the site was merely conclusory and not entitled to be accepted as true,
and the complaint was further deficient because it did not allege that
any contamination exceeded the applicable regulatory safe drinking
water standards.21 The district court also ruled that the actual-
contamination plaintiffs' causation allegations were inadequate because
the plaintiffs "did not establish a causal link between any particular
pollutant that specifically traveled from [the site] on one hand and the
pollution in The Acreage on the other," and thus the allegations of
causation were conclusory.22 Finally, the district court ruled that the
anticipated-contamination and proximity plaintiffs could not state a
17. Id. at 1165.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1165-66.
20. Id. at 1166-67.
21. Id. at 1167, 1171. The Supreme Court, inAshcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009),
explained its holding in Twombly, stating, "[TIhe tenet that a court must accept as true all
of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678.
22. Adinolfe, 768 F.3d at 1171.
954 [Vol. 66
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state-law claim for "stigma" damage to their property values in the
absence of actual contamination.23
In disentangling the two issues, the Eleventh Circuit first held that
the district court erred in issuing the Lone Pine order "requiring factual
support for the plaintiffs' claims before it ha[d] determined that those
claims survive a motion to dismiss under Twombly. '" The Eleventh
Circuit stated that
[w]hatever the general propriety and/or utility of Lone Pine or-
ders-matters we do not pass on today-they should not be used as (or
become) the platforms for pseudo-summary judgment motions at a time
when the case is not at issue and the parties have not engaged in
reciprocal discovery.'
The court went on to note,
We understand the district court's concern that, without a Lone Pine
order, a defendant in a case like this one would have to engage in
expensive and time-consuming discovery without the plaintiffs first
demonstrating some factual support for their claims. That concern
may be a valid one, but it cannot be allayed by use of a scheduling
order that runs counter to the adversarial process envisioned by...
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'
The court then turned to the dismissal of the plaintiffs' second
amended complaints, independent of the evidence submitted by the
parties in response to the district court's Lone Pine order, and held that
the complaints did state claims on which relief could be granted.27 The
court noted first that while the causes of action set out in the complaints
required the pleading of distinct elements, the defendant moved to
dismiss and the district court agreed based on "grounds common to all
of the claims instead of challenging whether the plaintiffs properly pled
each cause of action.""8 The Eleventh Circuit therefore confined its
analysis to those grounds for dismissal.29
First, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in
concluding that the actual-contamination plaintiffs had inadequately
alleged contamination.3" These plaintiffs alleged that each of their
23. Id. at 1171, 1176.
24. Id. at 1168.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1169.
27. Id. at 1169-76.
28. Id. at 1171-72.
29. Id. at 1172.
30. Id.
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properties "ha[d] been contaminated by [the defendant]."31 The court
stated that "[a]lthough this allegation may appear conclusory when read
in isolation, the complaint provides additional factual allegations that
easily push the 'contamination' plaintiffs' claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible."32 The court pointed to the allegations that
the defendant released contaminants into the soil, groundwater, and
surface water on its property; that The Acreage and the defendant's
property share the same aquifer; that the aquifer flows south from
defendant's property to The Acreage; and that water samples from test
wells in The Acreage contained three specific contaminants also found
on the defendant's property.33 The court stated that, in the aggregate,
these allegations made the claim that the defendant had contaminated
each of the actual-contamination plaintiffs' individual properties
plausible.34 The court also held that the district court erred in requir-
ing each of the actual-contamination plaintiffs allege they tested their
properties, noting that while such testing might be necessary for the
plaintiffs to meet their burden of persuasion, it was not necessary to
plead a prima facie case.35
The court also held the plaintiffs were not required to allege that
contamination on their properties exceeded the Florida safe drinking
water standards for various contaminants. 3' The court reached this
conclusion based on "the substantial body of Florida law endorsing the
basic tort principle that 'while one's compliance with a statute or an
ordinance may amount to evidence of reasonableness, such compliance
is not tantamount to reasonableness as a matter of law."'37 The court
noted that while courts dealing with groundwater contamination in other
jurisdictions hold that a plaintiff must show the alleged contamination
exceeds the applicable maximum contaminant levels, "that view is not
unanimous, and Florida courts have not endorsed such a rule."'
Second, the court held that the plaintiffs had adequately pled
causation.39 Pointing to essentially the same set of fact allegations in
the complaint that it had focused on to conclude that the plaintiffs
31. Id.
32. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570) (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Id. at 1173.
34. See id. at 1172.
35. Id. at 1173.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1174 (quoting Westland Skating Ctr., Inc. v. Gus Machado Buick, Inc., 542
So. 2d 959, 964 (Fla. 1989)); see also Nicosia v. Otis Elevator Co., 548 So. 2d 854, 856 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
38. Adinolfe, 768 F.3d at 1174.
39. Id. at 1175.
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plausibly pled that the defendant had contaminated the plaintiffs'
properties, the court stated that "[i]n the aggregate, these assertions give
rise to a 'reasonable inference that [the defendant] is liable for the
misconduct alleged."'
Third, the court held that the proximity and anticipated-contamination
plaintiffs were not required to allege actual contamination of their
properties to seek diminution in property value based on the "stigma" of
their properties' proximity to contaminated areas.41 The court pointed
to precedent from the Florida Supreme Court holding that plaintiffs
bringing nuisance claims, strict liability claims, negligence claims, and
Florida environmental law claims could seek "stigma" damages without
showing a physical invasion of their property interests.42 The court
again distinguished St. Joe Co. v. Leslie,"3 the principal case relied on
by the defendant." The court acknowledged that language in the
Leslie case could support a contrary conclusion, but asserted that the
Florida Supreme Court cases it pointed to indicated that if the Florida
Supreme Court were to address the question, it would hold that "a tort
plaintiff seeking to recover for economic harm caused by pollution or
contamination need not own property that is itself polluted or contami-
nated."
5
II. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
In RB Jai Alai, LLC v. Secretary of the Florida Department of
Transportation," the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida, in an issue of first impression, concluded that claims
brought under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 7 and
the Federal Aid Highway Act (FAHA) s are subject to the Administra-
tive Procedure Act's (APA)4s six-year limitation period.50 The court
also took the position (though perhaps in dicta) that purely economic
40. Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
41. Id. at 1176.
42. Id. at 1177-78.
43. 912 So. 2d 21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). In St. Joe Co., the Court of Appeals of
Florida stated that "because no proof was adduced that any of the class representatives'
land was contaminated, the concept of 'stigma' damages is inapplicable." rd. at 24-25.
44. Adinolfe, 768 F.3d at 1177.
45. Id. at 1178.
46. No. 6:13-cv-1167-Orl-40GJK, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131792 (M.D. Fla. 2014).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h (2012).
48. 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-170 (2012).
49. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2012).
50. RB Jai Alai, LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131792, at *23-24; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 2401(a) (2012) (providing limitations period for civil actions).
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interests are not within the "zone of interests" protected by NEPA, and
thus a plaintiff claiming purely economic harm lacks standing to assert
a NEPA claim."1 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the plaintiffs
in this case, a jai alai club and two of its employees, alleged more than
merely economic harm and thus did have standing to assert a NEPA
claim.52 Accordingly, the court denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss the complaint except pertaining to the portion of the complaint
challenging agency action more than six years prior to the filing of the
complaint.53
In the early 2000s, the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT)
developed a plan, finalized in 2004, to build an overpass allowing U.S.
Highway 17-92 to cross over State Road 436 in Seminole County, Florida
(the Project). The FDOT sought federal funding for the Project, which
triggered review under NEPA.5" The Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA) and FDOT determined that the Project qualified for a Categori-
cal Exclusion (CE) under FHWA's regulations,55 meaning that no
environmental assessment or impact study was required under NEPA.
In 2012, because of design changes in the Project, the agencies re-
evaluated whether the Project continued to qualify for a CE and
determined that it did."
The plaintiffs filed suit in 2013, generally challenging the agencies'
determination that the Project was exempt from NEPA and also
claiming that the approval and funding of the Project violated FAHA.
In relevant part, the complaint alleged that the overpass proposed in the
Project would cause greater traffic and congestion around the plaintiffs'
business (thus increasing the risk of injury to persons using the
business), would decrease access to the business resulting in economic
harm, and would increase air and noise pollution around the busi-
ness.
5 7
The defendants, FDOT and FHWA, moved to dismiss the complaint.
The defendants asserted that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they
had not suffered a cognizable injury under NEPA or FAHA and because
the plaintiffs' alleged harms were not within the zone of interests
protected by the statutes; that the complaint was a "shotgun" pleading
and impossible to answer; that the complaint failed to state claims under
51. RB Jai Alai, LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131792, at *18-19.
52. Id. at *20-21.
53. Id. at *29-30.
54. Id. at *2-3.
55. 23 C.F.R. § 771.117(a) (2014).
56. RB Jai Alai, LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131792, at *3.
57. Id. at *4-5, *14.
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the statutes; and that, regarding the defendants' action initially
exempting the Project from NEPA review in 2004, the claims were
barred by the statute of limitations.58
The defendants first contended that the injuries the plaintiffs alleged
were "merely conjectural" and that the complaint failed to set out facts
from which the court could conclude that the plaintiffs suffered actual
harm.59 However, the court concluded that the general factual allega-
tions were sufficient to allege a concrete and particularized risk of harm,
and thus the complaint sufficiently alleged injury for constitutional
standing purposes.'
The defendants also contended that as a business alleging economic
harm, the plaintiffs did not fall within the zone of interests protected by
NEPA or FAHA and thus lacked "prudential" standing.6' In response
to that argument, the court, noting a "disagreement among the circuits"
regarding whether NEPA protects purely economic interests, first
explained that under Eleventh Circuit precedent a plaintiff must
demonstrate, among other things, an environmental injury to fall within
NEPA's zone of interests.62 Therefore, the court "side[d] with those
courts concluding that purely economic injuries with no connection to the
environment are insufficient to fall within NEPA's zone of interests."63
However, the court concluded the plaintiffs here had alleged environ-
mental injuries in addition to economic ones and therefore fell within
NEPA's zone of interests for standing purposes."4
The court reached the same conclusion for the plaintiffs' FAHA claim,
explaining that the zone of interests protected by FAHA included
"transportation, economic growth, environmental protection, land use,
aid quality of life," and that the allegations of the complaint that placed
the plaintiffs within NEPA's zone of interests also placed them within
that of FAHA.rs
Next, the court, addressing what it described as an issue of first
impression in the Eleventh Circuit-whether a NEPA action was subject
to a limitation period--concluded that such actions were subject to the
six-year limitation period for actions brought under the APA.66 As a
result, the court ruled that the portion of the plaintiffs' complaint
58. Id. at *6-7.
59. Id. at *15.
60. Id.
61. Id. at *15-16, *18.
62. Id. at *18.
63. Id. at *19.
64. ld. at *20-21.
65. Id. at *21-23.
66. ld. at *23-24.
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challenging the defendants' initial decision in 2004 to exclude the Project
from NEPA review was time-barred.67
Finally, based largely on the factual allegations the court had already
determined established that the plaintiffs had standing, the court
concluded that the complaint adequately stated claims for relief under
both NEPA and the FAHA."8 The court denied the defendants' motion
to dismiss the complaint, except the portion the court concluded was
time-barred.69
III. CLEAN WATER ACT-SECTION 404
In Black Warrior Riverkeeper, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,7"
a challenge to the Corps of Engineers' (the Corps) reissuance of
Nationwide Permit 21 (NWP 21) 7" under section 404 of the Clean
Water Act (the CWA),72 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama concluded, among other things, that
downstream water quality fell within the "zone of interests" protected by
§ 404 of the CWA, and thus the plaintiffs, users of a river whose water
quality they alleged was degraded by surface mining operations in the
river's watershed, had standing to bring their challenge under § 404. 73
However, the court also concluded that the plaintiffs' action, filed ten
months after the reissuance, was barred by laches and for this and other
reasons granted summary judgment to the defendants.7 4
Under § 404, the Corps may issue general permits (known as
nationwide permits) allowing the deposit of dredged or fill material into
jurisdictional waters-in lieu of requiring permittees to apply for
individual permits-if the Corps determines that the activities covered
by the nationwide permits will have only minimal effects on the
environment both individually and cumulatively.75 By law, nationwide
permits are limited to five-year terms.76
The Corps first issued NWP 21 in 2007, 7 authorizing surface mining
operations to deposit dredged or fill material into waters of the United
States, subject to certain restrictions. The Corps reissued NWP 21 in
67. Id. at *25-26.
68. Id. at *29.
69. Id. at *29-30.
70. 23 F. Supp. 3d 1373 (N.D. Ala. 2014).
71. Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184 (Feb. 21, 2012).
72. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (2012).
73. Black Warrioer Riverkeeper, Inc., 23 F. Supp. at 1376-77, 1382-83.
74. Id. at 1393.
75. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e).
76. Id.
77. Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 72 Fed. Reg. 11,092 (Mar. 12, 2007).
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2012. The 2012 version separated mining operations into two categories:
those that had previously received authorization to operate under the
2007 NWP 21 (the reauthorization provision), and those that had not.
The 2012 NWP 21 applied more restrictive standards to operations that
had not been previously authorized under the 2007 version than to those
that were previously authorized. Thus, previously authorized operations
were allowed to continue in ways that were potentially more damaging
to the environment than were newly authorized operations. The 2012
version was issued on February 18, 2012, and became effective March
19, 2012. The first previously authorized mining operation was
reauthorized under the 2012 NWP 21 in May 2012, and by February
2013, thirty-nine reauthorizations had been granted.7 8
The plaintiffs, environmental groups whose members "use and enjoy
waters downstream" from the surface mining operations authorized
under NWP 21, filed suit on November 25, 2013. 79 The plaintiffs
challenged the 2012 NWP 21, in particular the section applying more
lenient restrictions to previously authorized operations, on two grounds.
First, the plaintiffs contended that the 2012 NWP 21 implicitly extended
the 2007 NWP 21 beyond its statutorily mandated term of five years.
Second, the plaintiffs contended that the Corps's cumulative-effects
analysis of the reauthorization provision was arbitrary and capricious
because: the Corps did not conduct a "cumulative effects" analysis of the
2012 NWP 21's reauthorization provision, as required by the CWA and
by NEPA; the Corps improperly relied on its 2007 analysis of cumulative
effects in issuing the 2012 NWP 21; and the Corps improperly considered
compensatory mitigation in its cumulative effects analysis. The
plaintiffs alleged that mining activities permitted under the 2012 NWP
21 had impaired downstream water quality and interfered with the
plaintiffs' aesthetic and recreational enjoyment of the water."0
The court first addressed the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.8" Specifically, the defendants contended
that the plaintiffs lacked standing because (1) § 404 does not regulate
water quality, which is exclusively regulated under section 402 of the
CWA, 2 and (2) the plaintiffs could not show that the alleged harm
78. Black Warrior Riverkeeper, 23 F. Supp. at 1378-80, 1385.
79. Id. at 1377, 1380.
80. Id. at 1377, 1387-88.
81. Id. at 1380. The plaintiffs' claim was challenged by both defendants, including the
Corps, and intervenors, including mining companies that had received re-authorizations
to operate under the 2012 NWP 21. Id. at 1376. The defending parties and the
intervenors will be collectively referred to as "the defendants."
82. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012).
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resulted from activities authorized by the 2012 NWP 21 "as opposed to
previous mining or unrelated activities." 3 The court concluded that the
plaintiffs did have standing to challenge the 2012 NWP 21 under
§ 404.84 First, the court reviewed both the regulatory framework of
§ 404 and cases from other jurisdictions and determined that the zone
of interests protected by § 404 went beyond loss of jurisdictional waters
and included effects on wildlife, water-related recreation, aesthetics, and
fisheries-the kind of harm the plaintiffs alleged.' The court also
concluded that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged causation and
redressability to confer standing.8 6
Turning to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs' claim was barred by laches.87 Even
though only ten months elapsed between the time the 2012 NWP 21 took
effect and the time the plaintiffs filed suit, the court found that the
plaintiffs could have filed suit as early as May 2012, when the first
mining operation was reauthorized under NWP 21, or February 2013,
when thirty-nine operations had been reauthorized, and that the delay
from that time until November 2013, when the plaintiffs filed suit, was
unexcusedse The court also found that by that time, companies
receiving reauthorization to operate under NW? 21 had purchased
equipment, hired workers, entered into contracts, and made sales
commitments.8 9 The court reasoned that forcing these companies to
cease operations pending the issuance of a new general permit, or
pending their applications for individual permits under § 404, would
result in lost income and other financial hardships.90 Finally, the court
found that the environmental benefits the plaintiffs claimed would result
if they received the relief sought were speculative because neither the
plaintiffs nor the court could predict what criteria the Corps would
impose were it required to issue a new general permit or issue individual
permits.9" Therefore, the court concluded that the defendants had
suffered undue prejudice as a result of the plaintiffs' delay in filing
83. Black Warrior Riverkeeper, 23 F. Supp. at 1381.
84. Id. at 1383.
85. Id. at 1382.
86. Id. at 1383.
87. Id. at 1393. The court noted that while some circuits disfavored laches as a defense
in environmental cases, "Ithe Eleventh Circuit has never adopted such a strict standard."
Id. at 1384.
88. Id. at 1385.
89. Id. at 1386.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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suit.9 2 Weighing these considerations, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs' claim was barred by laches.93
The court went on to address the plaintiffs' substantive contentions in
the context of the defendants' motion for summary judgment.9' First,
the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that by creating a separate set of
criteria governing reauthorizations, the Corps implicitly extended the
2007 NWP 21 beyond its statutorily mandated five-year term.95 The
court reasoned that the five-year term is merely a time limit and "does
not impose constraints on the content of general permits or require that
.. their treatment of permittees change for each permit reissuance."
96
In other words, the Corps could have reissued NWP 21 in 2012 using
criteria identical to the 2007 NWP 21, provided that the criteria were
otherwise in accordance with law and that operators re-applied for
authorization.
97
Second, the court concluded that the Corps's cumulative effects
analysis in connection with the 2012 NWP 21 was not arbitrary or
capricious.98 The court found that the Corps did conduct a new
analysis, that the Corps did not simply rely on the cumulative effects
analysis it performed for the 2007 NVP 21, and that the Corps's reliance
on compensatory mitigation to conclude that NWP 21 would have
minimal cumulative effects on the environment was supported by its
record (that is, the Corps's record showed that mitigation would in fact
minimize the effects of surface mining).99
92. Id. at 1387.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See i.
98. Id. at 1391.
99. Id. at 1388-92.
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